The EU ETS: CO2 prices drivers during the learning experience (2005-2007) by Alberola, Emilie et al.
The EU ETS: CO2 prices drivers during the learning
experience (2005-2007)
Emilie Alberola, Julien Chevallier, Benoˆıt Che`ze
To cite this version:
Emilie Alberola, Julien Chevallier, Benoˆıt Che`ze. The EU ETS: CO2 prices drivers during the
learning experience (2005-2007). 2009. <halshs-00389916>
HAL Id: halshs-00389916
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00389916
Submitted on 30 May 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1
The EU ETS: CO2 prices drivers  
during the learning experience (2005-2007) 
 
Emilie Alberola1, Julien Chevallier2 and Benoît Chèze3 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter identifies the main price drivers of European Union Allowances (EUAs), 
valid for compliance under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) created 
in 2005 to regulate CO2 emissions of more than 10,000 high carbon-intensive installations 
across Member States. Based on key design features of the EU ETS, this chapter develops 
carbon pricing strategies based on allowances supply and demand, institutional decisions, and 
the influence of other energy markets and weather conditions. Finally, we discuss the likely 
effects on economic growth on CO2 emissions and carbon prices as a by product. The 
discussions developed in this chapter focus on Phase I (2005-2007) of the EU ETS, which 
may described as the “pilot” period for the future development of this environmental market 
scheme.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The primary objective of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is to 
regulate CO2 emissions from the most energy-intensive industrial sectors. Installations have to 
surrender as many allocated allowances as their previous year’s emissions. By allowing the 
emergence of a price – called a European Union Allowance (EUA) - for each emitted ton of 
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CO2, the EU ETS aims at conveying appropriate price signals to industrial operators. They 
can select a combination of capital investments, operating practices, and emissions releases to 
minimise the sum of abatements costs and allowance expenses. The main characteristic of 
cap-and-trade systems consists in leaving to each firm the ability to decide its abatement 
strategies depending on its own risk preferences and perceptions about regulatory 
uncertainties, as well as technical opportunities (i.e. in terms of fuel-switching).  
 
The EU ETS needed to be functional on January 1, 2005. Its creation required the 
deployment of new governance processes between the European Commission, national State 
authorities, and operators in the 10,000 (and over) installations covered by the Directive 
2003/87/CE. The development of technical tools was also necessary to deal with the delivery 
of allowances on industrials’ accounts, and to guarantee the monitoring of transactions.  
 
This fast-track operational implementation was carried out with some delays (e.g., the 
start-up of the Polish registry) but without major difficulties. In 2005, the European Union 
carbon finance sector was born. Within the first three years of its infancy, active players in the 
market multiplied, organised exchanges were established, and trading activity quickly 
developed. The volume of over-the-counter trades in emission allowances and on the 
marketplaces has been constantly growing since then.  
 
This chapter aims at analyzing the price fundamentals of CO2 allowances during 2005-
2007. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the key design 
issues of the EU ETS. Section 3 analyzes the CO2 price drivers by detailing the emissions 
shortfall factor, supply and demand mechanisms, the influence of other energy markets and 
weather events, as well as the likely effects of economic growth. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Key design issues on the EU ETS  
 
This section briefly reviews the main design features of the European carbon market. The 
EU ETS has been created by the Directive 2003/87/CE. Across its 27 Member States, the EU 
ETS covers large plants from CO2-intensive emitting industrial sectors with a rated thermal 
input exceeding 20MWh. One allowance exchanged on the EU ETS corresponds to one ton of 
CO2 released in the atmosphere. 2.2 billion allowances per year have been distributed during 
 3
Phase I (2005-2007). 2.08 billion allowances per year will be distributed during Phase II 
(2008-2012). With a value of around 20€ per allowance, the launch of the EU ETS thus 
corresponds to a net creation of wealth of around 40 billion €. In January 2008, the European 
Commission extended the scope of the EU trading system to other sectors such as aviation 
and petro-chemicals by 2013, and confirmed its functioning for a third Phase until 2020. In 
the next section, we detail the price fundamentals of CO2 allowances. 
 
 
3. EUA Price drivers 
 
In this section, we define first the emissions shortfall factor, second we detail the 
allowances supply and demand mechanisms, third we detail the influences of policy 
decisions, other energy markets and weather events. Fourth, we investigate the likely effects 
of economic growth on the price development of carbon prices. 
 
 
3.1 The “emissions shortfall” factor 
 
 Whereas on energy markets the central pricing issue concerns the state of stocks, on 
the ETS the main question is the expected “emissions shortfall” factor during each 
compliance year. The emissions shortfall factor, defined as the difference between verified 
emissions and allocated allowances within a given compliance year, depends on the emissions 
abatements required by the cap, which are unknown but estimable based on reliable recent 
data.  
 
3.2 Allowances supply and demand mechanisms 
 
As for other commodity markets, the EUA price is driven by the balance between 
supply and demand, and by other factors related to market structure and institutional policies. 
However, EUAs exhibit strong features of being a non-standard commodity: installations do 
not need to physically hold allowances to produce, but only to match them with verified 
emissions for their yearly compliance report to the European Commission.  
 
3.2.1. Supply of EUAs 
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On the supply side, the first period of the market was quite limited, as no other carbon 
credits than Phase I EU allowances could be used for compliance: neither the use of Kyoto 
credits – even if transactions started in 2003 – nor Phase II EUAs – through borrowing - were 
allowed. Thus, the number of allowances available on the market was strictly equal to the 
number of allowances initially allocated to installations and to new entrants4. 
 
3.2.2. Demand of EUAs 
 
While allowance supply is politically fixed by each Member States through National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs), allowance demand is function of expected CO2 emissions. In the 
short and long run, the level of emissions depends on a large number of factors.  
 
Short term abatement decisions, and thus the demand for allowances, are mainly 
driven by unexpected fluctuations in energy demand, energy prices and weather conditions 
(temperatures, rainfall and wind speed). CO2 emissions in the EU-ETS are linked one-to-one 
to the use of fossil fuels (such as oil, gas, coal). In turn, the demand for fossil fuels depends on 
their absolute and relative prices. The marginal fuel switching costs from high carbon-
intensive sources of energy to low carbon-intensive sources for power and heat generation are 
the most important measures for carbon abatement in the short run, since power and heat 
operators are major actors on the EU ETS5.  
 
Other factors influencing the demand for allowances are unexpected fluctuations of 
demand for energy in the short run. As outlined by Alberola et al. (2008), CO2 prices are 
affected by unexpected weather variations like temperatures, rainfall and wind. Cold winters 
increase the need for heating by electricity or fuels, whereas warm summers lead to higher 
electricity demand for cooling and lower rate of utilization of nuclear power plants due to 
reduced cooling by rivers. Rainfall, wind speeds and sun shine hours affect the share of power 
generated by carbon-free heat generation from hydropower, wind and solar energy. As a 
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whole, weather is widely acknowledged to have played an important role in explaining CO2 
prices. 
 
In the long run, the demand of allowances can be affected by economic growth and 
marginal abatement costs. Abstract from very long term investments like carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), CO2 emissions cannot be reduced by end-of -pipe technologies. Long-term 
marginal abatement costs are determined by investment decisions in low carbon-intensive 
energy utilities and in energy efficiency measures. Overall, with respect to high investment 
costs and uncertainties about the future of the EU ETS in 2005, firms faced mainly short term 
abatement costs during the first trading period when deciding on their allowance demand. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional factors, other energy markets and weather influences 
 
One of the most difficult factors to capture the influence on EUA demand is “market 
sentiment”. This expression refers to factors such as uncertainty about future energy prices 
and policy decisions. These factors are indeed especially important for investors’ expectations 
and the formation of their risk strategies.  
 
There exists an emerging literature analysing the empirical relationships between EU 
carbon prices and its determinants during 2005-2007 that we propose to detail below.  
 
3.3.1 Evidence on the impacts of the European Commission’s voice 
 
Institutional decisions on the overall stringency of the cap have an impact on the 
carbon price formation through initial allocation. Besides, any decision or announcement from 
regulators (being Member States or the European Commission) may induce changes in market 
players’ behaviour. Official communications by the European Commission were essential to 
reach a better information flow on installations' net short/long positions6 during Phase I. The 
disclosure of compliance results may be seen as the cornerstone of changes in market 
participants’ expectation and strategies. In April 2006, when Member States and the European 
Commission disclosed the 2005 verified emissions for all EU ETS installations, the gap 
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between initial allocation to industrials and business-as-usual emission forecasts appeared 
positive, thereby causing a sharp fall in carbon prices of all maturities (more than 50% in four 
days).  
 
Political choices can also impact the functioning of the market: in October 2006, 
announcements by the European Commission to validate more strictly NAPs during Phase II 
reinforced the general feeling that the market could be short during 2008-2012. From this 
date, Phase II prices increased and stabilized over 20€/ton of CO2. Alberola et al. (2008) 
identify statistically two structural endogenous breaks in the time-series of spot prices during 
2005-2007: the first compliance period break goes from April 24, 2006 to June 12, 2006; and 
the second break due to the EU Commission stricter Phase II validation occurred from 
October 26, 2006 onwards7.  
 
3.3.2 Evidence of the relationships between energy prices and carbon prices 
 
Energy prices are the most important short term drivers of the demand for EUAs, due 
to the ability of power generators to switch between their fuel inputs (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 
(2007), Delarue and D’haeseleer (2007), Alberola et al. (2008), Bunn and Fezzi (2008), 
Ellerman and Feilhauer (2008)). As shown by Alberola et al. (2008), energy prices forecast 
errors have basically driven EUA price changes during 2005-2007, but their influence 
changed depending on institutional events. Brent, natural gas, coal, clean dark and spark 
spreads, as well as switch prices 8  all impact significantly carbon spot prices, but their 
influence vary following the two structural breaks detected in the time series, and the 
corresponding sub-periods under consideration.  
 
As detailed above, weather conditions have an impact on EUA prices by influencing 
energy demand. During the winter 2006, colder temperatures than the decennial average have 
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had the expected statistical positive impact on EUA price changes. During the summer 2006 
and the winter 2007, hotter temperatures than their decennial averages have affected 
negatively carbon price changes. (Alberola et al. (2008)).  
 
 
3.4 The puzzle of economic activity effects on CO2 emissions and EUA prices 
 
Economic activity is maybe the most obvious and the less understood driver of CO2 price 
changes. Economic growth leads to an increase in energy demand, and to higher industrial 
production in general. The first empirical analysis devoted to this topic may be related to 
Alberola et al. (2009a).   
 
 
Figure 1: Industrial production in EU 27 during 2005-2007 
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 Source: Eurostat– calculations from the Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, economic activity in Europe has been relatively robust since the 
launch of the EU ETS in 2005: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the EU 25 grew by 1.9% in 
2005, and 3.0% in 2006 according to Eurostat. Industrial production, seasonally adjusted by 
Eurostat, rose by 2.8% in 2005, and by 4.4 % in 2006. The trend has been similarly rising 
during 2007.  
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Figure 2: Industrial productions in EU ETS sectors 
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 Source: Eurostat– calculations from the Mission Climat of Caisse des dépôts. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, production growth in the EU ETS sectors was contrasted during the 
first three years of the scheme. In 2005, four sectors recorded a negative growth at the 
aggregated EU level: coke, refineries, glass and ceramics sectors. The EU coke sector 
recorded a strong decrease by -20%, mainly localized in Poland (-32%), and in the United-
Kingdom (-7%). The decrease in annual production in three other sectors was limited. The 
glass production decreased strongly by -9.88% in Germany, by -4.28% in the United-
Kingdom whereas it increased by 5.02% in Spain, and by 13.72% in Poland. The production 
of ceramics decreased in 2005 in all Member States, with the exception of Poland where it 
increased by 19.55%. Five sectors recorded a positive production growth in 2005: paper, 
cement, iron, metal and combustion9. More particularly, in the combustion sector production 
grew in all MS, from 2.24% in the UK to 12.95% in Italy.  
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and Trotignon et al. (2008) classify between large electricity production plants, district heating facilities 
(cogeneration when details were available) and other installations. 
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In 2006, whereas industrial production increased in seven industries, the combustion 
sector recorded a decrease by - 4.93% at the EU level, and in all countries from 1.83% in 
Spain to -8.13% in Germany and -9.36% in Italy. These trends were stable during 2007. 
 
 Based on these characteristics of the global economic context and of diverging 
industrial production changes in EU ETS sectors, Alberola et al. (2009a) attempt to 
disentangle econometrically potential impacts ranging from the production to the 
environmental spheres on carbon price changes. Their econometric analysis shows that three 
among nine sectors have a significant effect on EUA price changes from July 1, 2005 to April 
30, 2007. These sectors are combustion, paper and iron and total 78% of allowances allocated. 
Besides, they identify through which channels variations of industrial production from EU 
ETS sectors may operate on EUA price changes: both the variation of production and the net 
short/long position are significant and have the expected effects on CO2 price changes. The 
role played by yearly compliance positions and production peaks on this new market is 
demonstrated. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Alberola et al. (2009b) have extended 
these results to a country-specific analysis of industrial sectors during 2005-2007. The latter 
results revealed the role played by the German power sector in overall affecting EUA price 
changes based on this decomposition between industrial activity and CO2 emissions effects. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter features an analysis of the CO2  price determinants in the EU ETS during 
the “pilot” Phase (2005-2007). Following a brief review of key design issues in the EU 
ETS, we have detailed the main carbon price drivers based on classic supply and demand 
analysis, but also with respect to the salient characteristics of the European cap-and-trade 
program (especially in terms of aggregated level of verified emissions and compliance). 
Finally, we have emphasized that the main price drivers are linked to institutional 
decisions, other energy market prices (oil, gas, coal, electricity, and more generally fuel-
switching in the power sector), and unanticipated temperatures changes. The last puzzle 
that remains to be solved concerning Phase I EUA price drivers lies in the determination 
of the influence of economic activity, through changes in CO2 emissions levels, as 
initiated by recent empirical analyses. 
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